But in reality both sides were right in regarding the "form of words" as being far more than a "little" matter. The minority, with deep conviction, considered that the omission of any mention of the involvement of the episcopate in the preservation and teaching of the faith was an omission of something essential to the historic understanding of the Church. The majority, for their part, were determined to assert a strictly monarchical version of papal supremacy and to exclude any phrase that might suggest any kind of qualification or limitation of that sovereign ruling and teaching power. Specifically, as the precise wording of the "ex sese" clause indicates, they were determined to close and bolt the door forever on the dreaded spectre of "Gallicanism." The dogmatic constitution Pastor aeternus, in its finished form, states that the definitions of the Roman pontiff are irreformable "ex sese, non autem ex consensu answered by careful study of what these many prelates actually said in their writings, in the council debates, and elsewhere. 8 The present study, however, will not deal with this specific question or with other questions about Vatican I itself.
Given that abhorrence for Gallicanism produced the "ex sese" clause, a second question must inquire into the actual church-and-papacy thought of the historic Gallicanism of the 17th and 18th centuries in France. One must ask whether the basic convictions ofthat ecclesiological tradition need to be described only in abhorrent terms and branded as simply incompatible with a genuine acceptance of papal primacy. This is particularly so in view of the rediscovery in recent decades of the more collégial and consensual ecclesiology of the early and medieval centuries, which Gallicanism knew well and on which it consistently drew. 9 The present article is part of a study of what Gallican theologians actually said about church authority, and especially what they said in defense of Article 4 of the Declaration of 1682, dealing with the concurrence of the Church with papal statements. It is disconcerting to find how little attention has been devoted even by scholarly historians to the actual Gallican sources on this subject. Authors such as Thils, Fries, Nau, and Aubert, to· name only four, speak of "the Gallican doctrine" without citing a single Gallican treatise or any study about Gallicanism. 10 The part article he gives abundant, precise references to the conciliar sources but makes no references to Gallican sources. 8 A natural correlate to a study of the classic Gallican tradition is an examination of the opposing papalist or Roman (ultramontane) ecclesiology, which eventually triumphed at Vatican I. Papalist authors writing treatises De ecclesia after 1682 explicitly reacted to the Gallican Declaration, and this enters into their rearticulation of monarchical papal authority. Studying the specific terms in which they criticize the Gallican view on the consensus of the Church helps to understand how two conceptions of the same Church can differ so markedly that what is properly integral to one is totally foreign to the other. Attending closely to this key question of the consensus of the Church, we shall simply study one important representative of each school, Honoré Tournély, a spokesman of mainline Gallicanism, and Pietro Ballerini, a forceful and influential spokesman of the Roman or papalist view.
HONORÉ TOURNÉLY
Honoré Tournély (1658-1729), professor of theology at the Sorbonne (1692-1716) and author of a number of treatises in theology, provides in his Praelectiones theologicae de ecclesia Christi (first published in 1726) an excellent delineation of the central current of Gallican thought on the Church and the papacy. 11 M. Dubruel, correctly describing him as "one of the most moderate, but also one of the most learned" and influential Gallican theologians, uses him as a representative exponent of Gallican ecclesiology in his DTC article on Gallicanism.
12 Regarding the consensus of the Church, Tournély adheres seriously to Article 4 of the Declaration of 1682, seeing it as a quite valid expression of much traditional Catholic thought on the nature of papal teaching authority. His detailed and nuanced study of this point has been neglected even by the few modern scholars who have written on Tournély. 12 M. Dubruel, "Gallicanisme," DTC 6/1, 1096-1137. Dubruel gives a lengthy summary of Tournées ecclesiology (1097-1108) and of his church-state thought (1118-22). He deals with the topic of the consensus of the Church (1103-7), but really makes only brief mention of Tournély's extended discussion of many aspects and nuances of this question. J. Carreyre's short DTC article on "Tournély" (15/1,1242-44) does not go into any particulars of Tournély's ecclesiology. 13 Johann Mayr, in the one book-length study on Tournély (η. 11 above), does deal with the consensus of the Church in two places: 125-33 concerning the infallibility of the Church, and 139-46 on the infallibility of the Roman pontiff. But in neither of these does he discuss Tournély and the Church Many years of research and reflection are clearly evident throughout Tournély's extended analysis of authority in the Church, a topic pursued systematically and insightfully throughout his massive treatise De ecclesia, whose two parts total some 700 closely printed octavo pages. Tourné-ly's deep ecclesial concern comes through very clearly in his Praefatio addressed to students of theology. Here he says that, amid many ongoing challenges encountered by the faith community, the individual will find in adherence to the Church steady and reliable guidance.
14 The Church is custodian and sustainer of the faith, and the supreme judge of controversies about it. Moreover, Tournély urges all his students to preserve communion with the successor of Peter, citing the Council of Florence on papal primacy. 15 The Church's firmness against schismatics and other challenges comes from its enduring unity in faith with its visible head.
16
At no time does Tournély tend to "omit" the papacy from the description of the Church or to depreciate its importance. The contrary is true at every point. Indeed, when he defines the nature of the Church, he actually, like Bellarmine, includes the Roman pontiff in the definition of the Church. "The Church is rightly defined as an assembly of persons joined in the profession of one and the same Christian faith, and in the communion of the same sacraments, under the government of the legitimate pastors, and especially the Roman pontiff. communion, and no one can be accounted Catholic except one who is joined in unity of faith and doctrine with it." 19 This theme of the necessity of union with the Roman pontiff, while undergoing many refinements of nuance, is maintained consistently throughout the work.
Addressing the issue of authority in the Church, he asks first: "Who is the supreme judge of controversies of faith?" 20 Through eight pages he says that it is not Scripture alone. 21 Nor is it the individual inspiration of the Holy Spirit, for "in every well-ordered and well-constituted state it is necessary that there be judges, who interpret the law" for all. 22 So also "the law of faith must be public and known, given the nature of the Church as a visible society."
23 Again, the secular prince cannot be recognized as the judge in matters of faith. He is indeed the guardian and maintainer of the laws of the Church and of the dogmas of religion, "but he is not the arbiter or supreme judge of controversies of faith." Thus, clearly it is the Church which is the judge of doctrinal questions: "only the Church is the supreme and infallible judge of controversies of faith."
26 For Tournély, Church, when there is question of authority, does not mean the whole community of faith but only the hierarchy, "that is, the supreme pontiff and the bishops, whom the Holy Spirit has placed as bishops to rule the Church of God, either in council or apart from a council." 27 The Church, he says in a later connection, has a living, public authority competent to resolve questions and doubts, and this is the Roman pontiff and the bishops. It is not the "populus Christianus" but the "rectores et pastores" of the Church. 28 Tournély's Church is a hierarchical one.
The Roman Pontiff
The term, the head of the Church, Tournély says, has two uses. "There is a head of the Church that is supreme, essential, and invisible, and this is Christ." 29 And there is a "head that is ministerial, visible, and external, the Roman pontiff, who is called the supreme pontiff par excellence 31 Contrary to the accusation often made by papalist authors, that the Gallicans attributed to the papacy a mere primacy of honor, he affirms that "by the word primacy we understand not only a prerogative of honor and dignity, but also a pre-eminence of power and jurisdiction." 32 This is the historic belief of the Church, he adds, and it is only in these "later times" that the primacy of Peter has been impugned, by Luther, Calvin, and the other Protestants. 33 It is agreed among all orthodox (Catholic) theologians that the Roman pontiff possesses by divine privilege a primacy of jurisdiction and authority over the entire Church. "It is in assigning the limits and prerogatives of this authority and jurisdiction that they differ exceedingly with each other."
34
In other words, Tournély says, we all agree on papal primacy, but the key question is: What are the prerogatives that come with the primacy? He lists and discusses three different positions found among Catholic theologians.
The first he terms that of the "ultramontanes." They consider that the Roman pontiff is an absolute monarch, that the fulness of ecclesiastical jurisdiction resides in him alone, and that from him a certain portion of it flows down to the individual bishops. They believe that the pontiff defining ex cathedra cannot err and that he can be judged by no one, not even a general council. Finally, they regard him as "lord of the whole world," with power to depose kings and release subjects from their oath of fealty. 35 (deprimit) the papal, and violates the legitimate privileges of the primacy of the Roman See." 37 Richer, as Tournély reports, maintains that Christ conferred the keys of jurisdiction directly on the Church as a whole, and not on Peter or the apostles. The pope and bishops receive such authority as they have from the Church, an authority which is instrumental and executive. Thus the pope is a symbolic and ministerial head, and not essential to the existence of the Church. 38 Tournély had no use whatever for Richerism, but it was a view popular among a number of rank-andfile clergy in France at that time.
39
Between these two extremes, says Tournély, there is a sententia media, a middle position, which upholds the primacy of the Roman pontiff in carefully stated terms. 40 The pope, as head of all the (local) churches, is solicitous for the observance of the canons in the universal Church. In questions of faith and morals he has the leading role ("praecipuas partes"), and his decrees apply to all the churches. Although he is "not the sole judge of controversies" and is "not infallible," all the members of the Church should recognize that his words carry great weight and should assent to them. If there is a major and prolonged controversy, the Roman pontiff has the power to summon all the bishops to a council. It is here, at an assembly of the entire episcopate of the universal Church, that there is the "supreme and infallible authority" needed to settle definitively a question that has agitated the Church.
41
In this passage Tournély does not apply the name Gallican to this "middle position" regarding papal primacy, which he clearly espouses himself, but it is that of mainline episcopal or ecclesiastical Gallicanism as expressed in Articles 2, 3, and 4 of the Declaration of 1682. "What kind of regimen was established by Christ in the Church?" 42 It is agreed among Catholics, Tournély says, that the Church is not a democracy, in which the power of deciding doctrine and policy is accorded to the multitude. 43 Rather, the Church is certainly a monarchy, for it has one supreme pontiff who has the primacy not simply of honor but of jurisdic- tion. 44 But there are several kinds of monarchy. Granted that the Church is "truly monarchical," is it also "purely monarchical," which would mean that the whole Church "depends on the arbitrium (judgment) and Imperium (power to command) of the Roman pontiff alone?" 45 No, the Church is not such an absolute monarchy! "The regimen of the Church is not purely monarchical but tempered with aristocracy, and the exercise of apostolic power is to be moderated through the canons established by the Holy Spirit and consecrated by the reverence of the whole world." 46 This is the view, he says, which is properly asserted by Article 3 of the Declaration of the Gallican Clergy of 1682. The "aristocracy" is, of course, the episcopate, which is also of divine institution and has according to both Scripture and tradition a true authoritative voice in deciding controversies of faith.
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The system of absolute monarchy, he continues, may be appropriate and laudable in civil society but not in the spiritual. One cannot argue from the civil sphere to the ecclesial, claiming that the Church must pattern itself after the civil model. Rather, "the condition and state of the Church depends solely on the will of Christ in instituting it."
48 There were good reasons why Christ did not want the Church to be purely monarchical. (1) Absolute domination could have incited and fostered pride in the primate and degenerated into tyranny. Thus Christ instituted a ministerial office, which is more conducive to humility. (2) The Church, as a spiritual communion, consists of free acts of faith and piety, and "cannot be ruled by force and external coercion through an absolute and monarchical power." 49 (3) The "communion of saints" cannot be governed by the personal will of one man but by "common and catholic consensus."
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The basic concern of the Gallican view comes through clearly and insistently in this section on the kind of regimen intended by Christ for the Church. Citing a number of popes from Julius I to Nicholas I who affirm that they govern the Church in accord with the canons, he concludes: "From so many outstanding testimonies of holy pontiffs emerges the axiom which we have always preserved from our ancestors with the greatest care: the Church is governed by law, not by absolute power." 51 And this is "the very solid foundation of the Liberties of our Gallican Church, firm and constant adhesion to the sacred canons of the 
Papal Infallibility and the Consensus of the Church
Tournély begins his 100-page study of the question "Can the supreme pontiff err in defining cases of faith and morals?" by quoting Article 4 of the Declaration of 1682, which states: "In questions of faith also the supreme pontiff has the principal role, and his decrees apply to all the churches; but his judgment is not irreformable unless the consensus of the Church is present with it." 53 We want our students of theology in France, Tournély says, to understand clearly the several positions on this celebrated question, so that they can intelligently defend this doctrine of the Gallican Church, always in such a way, of course, that the "sacred and legitimate authority of the Apostolic See remains intact."
54
In issuing the Declaration of 1682, Tournély points out, the Church of France did not violate Catholic orthodoxy or exceed its rights as a particular segment of the universal Church.
55 Papalist authors generally acknowledged begrudgingly that papal infallibility was not a defined dogma of faith. Pietro Ballerini, for example, writing a few years after Tournély, admitted this, as will be noted below. Tournély cites Robert Bellarmine as acknowledging reluctantly that the view denying papal infallibility, though "erroneous and proximate to heresy, is not properly heretical, since it is tolerated by the Church." 56 Tournély says: "Far more soundly and rightly, others think that this question is one of those about which there is, salva fide, dispute. For since there is nothing defined by the Church about this controversy, no party, whether affirming or denying, should be branded with the note of heresy. But the key question on this whole issue, as Tournély sees it, is: What provides the firm certitude, the irreformability, of a statement of the pontiff speaking ex cathedra? Does this come from the consensus and reception of the Church or from a divine privilege conferred on the Roman pontiff, enabling him to define the faith singlehandedly? The ultramontane school strongly holds for the latter, saying that the pope, speaking ex cathedra, is infallible before and independently of the consensus of the Church. Not only is the consensus of the Church totally unnecessary to the papal teaching function; it is actually not permitted for the Church, the episcopate, to refrain from concurring with a papal pronouncement.
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The view of the Gallican Church is distinctly opposed to the papalist, for it thinks that the judgment of the Roman pontiff in cases of faith and morals is subject to error, and is not certainly irreformable, unless the consensus of the Church is present with it. "Therefore, before that consensus, it does not consider the judgment of the First See irreformable." 61 The Church must be able to recognize in the papal pronouncement the belief of the historic community of faith, and for this there must be a wide involvement of the episcopate as a whole.
What is necessary, in Tournély's view of the consensus of the Church, is recognition of the genuine role of the episcopate in teaching the faith. He does not propose any single way in which this role of the episcopate is implemented. The consensus of the Church (episcopate) may be antecedent, concomitant, or subsequent, and it may be express or tacit.
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It is antecedent if the papal doctrine has already become rather widely known, e.g. from having been worked out at several councils. It is concomitant when the bishops are in council with the pope and there decide upon the position to be taken. Tournély stresses that a general council does not receive authority from the supreme pontiff, but rather has received immediately from Christ himself the gift of teaching the faith without error. dioceses. In either case the latter add their judgment to the judgment of the supreme pontiff.
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Whatever the manner in which the bishops receive the papal decree, "they always utilize their right and authority received from Christ to judge cases of faith; in accepting the decree they interpose their judgment and consensus."
65 Sometimes the matter is so clear and well known that the bishops can and do concur in the papal statement without need of further study or discussion. This is what happened, Tournély thinks, in the case of Jansenism. The bishops of France received the bull Unigenitus readily and without feeling the need for further analysis and discussion.
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He says in an earlier reference to this episode that the bishops received the bulls against Jansenism "not in blind obedience but with prior understanding and judgment of the matter."
67 Tournély stresses that in this situation the bishops are not acting "only as executors" of the pontifical will "but are fulfilling and carrying out the role of judges."
68 In this reception they are not extolling themselves as judges of the supreme pontiff "but only exercising the right entailed in the episcopal dignity."
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Individual bishops, of course, cannot subject the judgment of the supreme pontiff to their own judgment. Only the universal Church, "when assembled in general council, can subject the statement of the Roman pontiff to a new examination and judgment, or even annul it."
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The consensus of the episcopate may be express or it may be tacit and "interpretative."
71 The latter may be said to happen when the papal pronouncement has been adequately published and made known, and bishops do not remonstrate against it. As for the numerical or quantitative aspect of the consensus, Tournély states that it is not necessary to have the consensus of all the bishops. It is enough to have the concurrence of "the greater number, whereby the Church is sufficiently represented."
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A small number who do not want to concur should be considered bound to do so. In case of a major division in the episcopate, in which there are many bishops standing with the Roman pontiff and many disagreeing with him, "certainly one should adhere to the side which is conjoined The very conservative nature of Tournély's whole outlook on the Church comes through further as he inquires: Are the faithful bound to assent to a papal pronouncement on faith or morals as soon as it is issued (and promulgated in their country) and before it is clear that the bishops have confirmed it with their consensus?
75 He answers with an unequivocal yes, they are bound to assent to it, even though it is not yet strictly irreformable. The reason for this is that people should obey the authority of a legitimate superior even when it is still, strictly speaking, subject to error. The presumption is always in favor of the superior authority, and it is not up to individual members of the Church to try to judge the Tightness or wrongness of the authority's act.
76
In concluding pages of his discussion of papal authority, Tournély makes some penetrating comments in response to papalist arguments based on the Roman pontiffs role in convoking and confirming councils. Granting that it pertains to the pope to convoke a council, he asks: "What does that right (ivs) have in common with the privilege of inerrancy?" 77 Emperors used to convoke councils, and archbishops to convoke provincial councils. Do they need infallibility to do that? The Roman pontiff confirms councils. "Does he in doing this confer by himself alone strength, force, and firmness on the councils? Certainly not, for they have this immediately from Christ, [ these functions of teaching and clarifying doctrine and policy. Does this make every one of them infallible? "Are we bound to obey only superiors whom we know to be unable to err?" 80 No, we obey all those who have legitimate authority from God and who perform this function for Christ.
PIETRO BALLERINI
Pietro Ballerini (1698-1769), a priest of the diocese of Verona, produced many works of erudition, particularly in collaboration with his brother Girolamo. 81 Their edition of the works of Leo the Great (published 1753-59) was highly regarded and later adopted by Jacques-Paul Migne in the Patrologia latina? 2 Pietro wrote two major treatises on papal authority: De vi ac ratione primatus romanorum pontifkum, et de ipsorum infallibilitate in definiendis controversiis fidei (Verona, 1766) and Depotestate ecclesiastica summorumpontificum et conciliorum generalium (Verona, 1768) . Of these the De vi ac ratione most expressly represents his determination to produce "un opera sistematica contro le teorie gallicane."
83 Systematic it definitely is, and Giuseppe Alberigo aptly attributes much of Ballerini's influence on later authors to the rigorously methodical way in which he crafts the formulae that became "practically definitive" on papal supremacy and infallibility. 84 This influence can readily be traced in Pastor aeternus itself. 85 Pursuing the reasoning in his stern dismissal of Article 4 of 1682 is quite illuminating, showing why there is no place for the consensus ecclesiae in this vision of the Church. 
Nature and Force of the Primacy
Ballerini states plainly in the Preface to De vi ac ratione that he is going to take issue with those Catholic authors who say that they accept a primacy of jurisdiction but who dissent regarding the faculties or prerogatives that belong to the primacy. 87 They evidently do not understand either the true ratio (nature) of the primary or the vis (force) of its jurisdiction. The Catholic adversaries acknowledge, even in the 4th Gallican Article itself, that the Roman pontiff has the leading role in the issuance of dogmatic decrees, but they balk at agreeing that these are per se irreformable or infallible. 88 The adversaries say that they agree with the principle that there should be unity of communion and of faith with the Roman pontiff by reason of the primacy. What they fail to see is the conclusion that follows strictly from this: that the primacy itself contains the force (vis), the coercive force, to preserve both kinds of unity, and especially the unity of all believers in the faith of the Roman pontiff.
89
Spelling this out in rigorous systematic fashion will be the task of this book, and since it is a rigorous system, Ballerini asserts, it is necessary to study the whole system.
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The whole work does proceed in clear and logical fashion, each chapter setting forth and demonstrating a single, precisely phrased proposition. Chapters 1 through 7 enunciate such basic propositions as that Peter received the primacy, a primacy which is one not simply of order but also of jurisdiction, and which is personal, of divine right, and based on Gospel testimony. But it is the purpose of the primacy, addressed in proposition 8, which is supremely significant in Ballerini's conceptualization of papal 88 De vi ac ratione xv. 89 Ibid. xvi. The consistent translations for these key words, followed throughout here, are as follows: vis is always rendered as "force," potestas as "power," and auctoritas as "authority." Thus, Ballerini's favorite phrase vis coactiva ad unitatem fidei is always rendered as "coercive force for the unity of faith." Though it may sound rather harsh, "coercive force" is the literal meaning of vis coactiva, and he does have available to him, and occasionally uses, the alternative words potestas and auctoritas.
90 Ibid, xviii, xix.
authority, for everything is deduced from Christ's intention in establishing the primacy. This must be understood clearly, he says, in order to clarify the precise force and jurisdiction of the primacy. The reason for the primacy, as even the Gallican Declaration agrees, is "the unity of the Catholic Church." 91 Christ assigned to the chief pastor the duty of preserving the unity of the Church, and he "foresaw and provided everything that was necessary to guard and conserve his Church and its unity." 92 Proposition 9, asserting that the primacy must have "coercive force for catholic unity," bases itself on the guiding assumption that "God never commits an office to anyone without bestowing on him the faculties suitable for accomplishing it."
93 Thus Jesus Christ certainly conferred on Peter the full power needed to achieve the end of the primacy, and this is the strictly coercive force to form and maintain unity of faith.
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The power must be certainly coercive. It must be that "force of compelling (vis cogendi)" which is proper to "jurisdiction," which "cannot be understood without the coercive force which obliges the subjects."
95 It would have done no good to give Peter the role of merely representing unity "if the force of compelling to unity had not been added to it." 96 Peter had to have, necessarily, the full power to impose the faith on his subjects, the members of the Church.
It is in chapter 14 that Ballerini replies most directly and fully to the doctrine of the 4th Gallican Article. These Catholic adversaries, he says, do indeed see the principle of the primacy but somehow fail to see the consequences of it. The great and pervasive error of their Gallican stance is the insistence on imposing conditions on the acceptance of papal authority. They say that one need assent to definitions of the Roman pontiff only if it is evident that he is defining from the common faith and tradition of the apostolic Church, or if there is added at least the tacit consensus of the Church, from which one learns that it is the common faith.
97
Ballerini, in reply, will show that the necessity of assenting to papal definitions is not subject to any such conditions. asserts, are incompatible with the unity of the Church. The power of the primacy must be deemed "absolute (absoluta), n for if it is to be a force apt and efficacious to preserve unity of faith, then it "must not be tied to any condition of human judgment or will." 100 (It is characteristic of papalist authors to assume that the Roman pontiff speaks with divine judgment, and the episcopate with mere human judgment.) If we are not going to say that Christ provided badly for unity of faith when he established the Roman cathedra, then we must say that the Roman pontiff has in his primacy "absolute force, which is not subject to any condition."
101
The Roman pontiffs, when they assert a doctrine, certainly "proclaim from the common tradition the faith common at once to all the catholic churches," 102 and there cannot be any doubt about this. It is both superfluous and wrong to talk about any provisions being needed to judge the pope's exercise of the teaching office. The adversaries claim that definitions of the Roman pontiff are not irreformable "nisi accesserit consensus Ecclesiae." If this condition were valid, says Ballerini, then "all the coercive force for unity of faith" which we have been attributing to the Roman pontiff "would be void." 103 The stipulation in Article 4 really denies the coercive force of papal definitions, because it claims that they do not compel to unity "except after the consensus ecclesiae is added." 104 (The Gallican text, of course, pointedly omits such a chronological term as "after.") According to Scripture and the Fathers, Christ endowed the primacy with force which is by itself suitable and efficacious for obtaining its end, which is the unity of the Church. It has force enough "to compel the universal Church to unity." 105 But if that power depended on the consensus ecclesiae, then "the force and the right to compel (ius cogendi) would not be a proper and personal prerogative of the primacy, but rather of the Church, whose consensus would bestow the force of compelling on the definitions." Moreover, it would be difficult in practice, and time-consuming, to obtain such consensus and easy for adversaries to impede it. "Accordingly, it is false that the power of compelling to unity, which Christ bestowed on Peter and his successors in the primacy, was tied to the condition of the consensus of the Church." 106 When he committed to Peter the role of confirming the brethren in dissensions regarding the faith, "he committed it so that he [Peter] should compel them to assent and hold them in unity, and did not derive the force of compelling from their consensus." 107 tantes 5.24 (Versailles: J. A. Lebel, 1817, in which four-volume edition the passage cited is found on 1.298). Bishop Jacques-Bénigne Bossuet (1627-1704), a most important spokesman of the Gallican ecclesiology, will be treated at length in a later article. The duty of filially obeying papal definitions certainly applies to bishops also, emphatically including any bishops who, on receiving a decree from Rome, feel that they want to examine it and judge the matter defined. "In Catholic bishops assent out of obedience is always to be assumed."
108 If there is some "liberty" to examine and study a papal decree, this "does not liberate them from the submission and assent which all owe out of obedience." The only liberty of examination or judgment which is "conceded" to Catholic bishops is that which was vouchsafed to the Fathers at Chalcedon after the promulgation of St. Leo's dogmatic epistle on the errors of Eutyches. They were not allowed ("non licuit") to dispute the definition. They were allowed, on reading over his definition, to add their judgment to the pontifical (exclaiming "Peter has spoken through Leo!"), so as to help persuade any dissidents to return to unity.
109
If bishops in their sees conduct any examination of a papal statement, they weigh the traditions of their own churches and compare them with the apostolic definition. If their own concurs with it, they rejoice to have their tradition confirmed, happy to be reassured that their church has retained the "true faith." If theirs differs from the Roman definition, they are admonished that they diverge from the truth, because the Roman faith is the touchstone. 110 There is always the presumption of consensus in Catholic bishops. This includes those who receive papal decrees with some examination, who are always fewer, as well as the greater number who receive them with pious obedience.
111

No Human Conditions
After Ballerini published the De vi ac ratione in 1766, he wrote a much shorter treatise on papal infallibility, which he published in conjunction with his De potestate ecclesiastica in 1768. The shorter work, Appendix de infallibilitate pontificia in definitionibus dogmaticis, he describes in a prenote as a "compendium" of what he had said at greater length in the De vi ac ratione} 12 In actuality, the Appendix is not simply a briefer version, for in it he says some things not in the earlier work. Even more rigorously deductive than the De vi ac ratione, the Appendix affords further vivid insight into the whole conceptualization of papal authority which pervades the Roman ecclesiology, with particular reference to the reason for its very blunt and absolute rejection of any idea of reception or consensus of the Church.
Ballerini proceeds through a series of propositions, all strictly deduced from the starting concept enunciated in Proposition 1: "Papal authority, established for the purpose of conserving unity, especially unity of faith, must be sufficient by itself for the obtaining of this end."
113 God, when He establishes an office for some purpose, provides appropriate and sufficient means for certainly obtaining that purpose. This means, asserts Proposition 2, that papal authority must be full jurisdiction, which is endowed with coercive force.
114
Proposition 3 states emphatically the principle that rules out any notion of the consensus of the Church, and does so, incidentally, in language different from that of the De vi ac ratione. If any authority is to be per se sufficient, it must be such as not to need the support or help of any other authority. 115 This proposition "overturns the condition of the consensus of the Church, which the adversaries demand"; for if the apostolic authority to define matters of faith is endowed with suitable and sufficient power to preserve unity, then it must not need the consensus of the Church. 116 To say with the adversaries that the authority is sufficient if the consensus of the Church is added to it is to deny that it is apt and sufficient in itself. Papal authority does not need any support such as the consensus of the Church, a condition invented by the adversaries, "a new invention which was unknown in antiquity" and in church history.
117 Indeed, such a condition would undermine any authority in church or state: "Woe to the authority of superiors, even princes, if their precepts and laws do not have the force of obliging unless the consensus of the subjects is added." dictum of Irenaeus, and does so in terms that throw additional light on his basic understanding of papal teaching authority. Irenaeus, he says, certainly rejects any suggestion that the Roman see in any way depends on the consensus of the Church. Irenaeus says of the church of Rome that "it is necessary for every church to concur with this one because of its more potent principality." 119 In Ballerini's treatment of it, this is no longer simply a statement of a second-century author but a mighty neardivine proclamation of papal supremacy which seems almost to stand right beside the "Thou art Peter" of Matthew 16 and the "Feed my sheep" of John 21. It is a statement not only authoritative in the strictest sense in itself, but one from which one can deduce a whole array of corollaries about the sovereign papal power.
Irenaeus, according to Ballerini, teaches that there is a necessity imposed on all the faithful in all churches to concur with the church having the primacy. "The primacy, which by its own force imposes this obligation, by its own force requires the consensus."
120 By virtue of its potentior principalitas, the Roman church by itself alone is endowed with so much force "that it imposes on all the churches the necessity of unity and consensus. When this one faith is known, the consentient tradition and faith of all the others is at once known." 121 For Ballerini, the brief statement of Irenaeus is a powerful rejection of the 4th Gallican Article. Therefore, Irenaeus did not deduce the force of compelling all to unity from their consent, which he thought there is no need to inquire about or to learn; but rather deducing this consent from the coercive force of the Roman faith and primacy, he attributes to the Roman faith and primacy a force per se suffkiens to oblige all.
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The next four propositions of the Appendix spell out further corollaries of this. Number 4 asserts that the authority of the Roman pontiff, since it is sufficient to preserve unity in the entire Church, necessarily binds all Christians, singly and collectively, of whatever rank or station, including the episcopal. Proposition 5 adds that the authority that unifies the whole Church in faith imposes the obligation not only of external compliance but also of the inner assent and obedience of the mind.
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Such is the nature of faith. And "let no one think that bishops are excepted" from this duty of mental obedience, for they are obliged to obey no less than the rank and file of the clergy and laity. 124 doubt and all questioning as to whether the pontiff may have erred. "The internal assent proper to faith, by which the intellect is captured in the compliance of faith, cannot be conjoined with doubt; and accordingly simple doubt about a dogma is enough to violate faith." 125 This also follows rigorously from the starting principle: the authority necessarily gives full certitude, because otherwise it would not be sufficient to preserve the Church's unity of faith.
Hence also there must not be any talk about a need to check with the faith of any other parts of the Church. As Irenaeus has plainly said, "the faith of all the other Catholic churches must be the same as the Roman faith, which is the same as to say that the Roman faith is the same as the faith of all the Catholic churches, that is, of the Catholic Church itself." 126 Since this is so, "to ascertain the true Catholic faith, there is no need to inquire what is the faith of the other churches; inquiring about and learning the Roman faith is sufficient."
127
Papal authority, states Proposition 7, must be termed "infallible." Ballerini says that he deduces this from the infallibility of the whole Church, which according to the promises of Christ cannot err in the faith.
128 Surely the primatial authority, which has the role and power to teach and ensure the unity of that faith, must also be infallible. As has been indicated throughout, there cannot be any conditions attached to this authority.
Hence unity with the Roman faith is absolutely necessary. Accordingly, the prerogative of infallibility which must be attributed to it is an absolute prerogative, and the coercive force for the unity of faith is equally absolute, just as the infallibility and the coercive force of the Catholic Church itself are absolute, which [Catholic Church] must adhere to the Roman faith, as we learn from Irenaeus.
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Despite the very forceful way in which Pietro Ballerini asserts this monarchical conception of papal primacy, and despite the fact that he clearly considers it to be certainly true, he does not claim that it is a dogma of faith. Rather, he expressly acknowledges that it is not. In the latter part of the Appendix he addresses the question whether papal infallibility must be believed with the assent of faith. He answers, "I do not say that it must be believed as a matter of Catholic faith that the pope in deciding controversies of faith is infallible."
130 As a scholarly theologian writing in the 1760s, he knows that this has not been defined. Nonetheless, though not a defined dogma of faith, papal infallibility should be considered as certainly true, because it has been demonstrated by strict theological reasoning from certain premises. The adversaries are prevented only by their prejudices from recognizing this. But really it is wrong to dissent not only from statements that are defined of faith, but also from "propositions which are validly deduced from certain theological principles and clearly demonstrated."
132 Ballerini warns the adversaries to ask how they can be excused of all guilt before God if they impugn papal infallibility just because it is not defined, and incite people to slight that authority, thereby withdrawing them from unity of faith.
133
"Is not this clearly to oppose oneself to the institution and plan of Christ the Lord?"
134
It is difficult to concur with Ulrich Horst's view that Ballerini really hoped and expected, "by building his ecclesiology on the idea of communio, to reach a common ground with the Gallicans."
135 Though he wanted them to be convinced by the rigor of his argument, he had to be aware that this would be a simple conversion to his Roman view, not a "gradual meeting of minds."
136 Moreover, he did not really build his ecclesiology on the idea of communio. His starting point is Christ's establishment of the primacy to ensure unity in the Church, and communion is introduced only later, as a duty or obligation of the subjects. It is a duty which they cannot evade, because the Roman pontiff is "endowed with power to compel them to unity of charity or communion as well as of faith." naturally included in the former is naturally excluded from the latter.
For Ballerini, what is given from the beginning is the almighty primatial power established by the divine founder of the Church, and conferred on one man alone. This is the supreme power to rule and teach the whole community, and specifically to effect and maintain its unity of faith. All revolves around this power and all is deduced from this power. Once you understand the nature and purpose of this tremendous power, you can and necessarily must deduce from it in rigorous logical order all other aspects of the structure and functioning of the authority and of the whole Church itself. Upholding and revering this majestic power is the prime and central concern of the members of the Church, who should be grateful that God has wisely and magnanimously provided this power to guide them. This is plainly not a friendly climate for bringing up any questions about the participation of the members of the Church, including the entire episcopate, in the making of decisions about policy or doctrine. The instinctive tendency of this view is to perceive any suggestion about the involvement of the community as an infringement on The Power, as some kind of attempt, overt or devious, to evade or depreciate The Power. For this reason, the suggestion is rejected out of hand as being selfevidently wrong. One need not and should not even discuss or analyze its alleged merits, because any discussion might imply some deficiency in the sovereign power established by Jesus (and probably a lack of faith in Jesus himself).
Thus, a proposal that a definition of the supreme pontiff needs to be "received" by the community, and specifically by the world episcopate, is as obviously mistaken as any other failure to accept the plan of God. The great error of the Gallicans is to try to impose human conditions on the divine institution of the primacy. To say that the voice of the episcopate needs to be heard is to forget that the power of the primacy "must not be tied to any condition of human judgment or will." 138 The pope speaks divine truth, and any comments that bishops might have about it are assumed to be mere human judgments or preferences, which just might be tainted by some earthly concern. Again, any suggestion as to means to implement the idea of collegiality is dismissed as an attempt to import political and secular schemes into the sacred precincts of the Church.
For Tournély, what is given from the beginning in the description of the Church is the whole community, which needs and has a number of ministers. The congregation of the faithful is not an unstructured one, and it is not at all a democracy. It is a fully structured, hierarchical, and
De vi ac ratione 252. indeed monarchical institution. This ecclesiology genuinely accepts papal primacy, a Roman primacy not merely of honor but of jurisdiction over the whole Church, and at no time tries to minimize or depreciate papal authority. This view and the papalist view differ only regarding the prerogatives entailed in the primacy. Tournély says that only the Church, meaning the hierarchy as a whole, can infallibly decide an important question of faith, not the Roman pontiff by himself. For him, the consensus of the Church is an essential part, from the beginning, of a Church which is a community of faith endowed by its founder with bishops as well as a pope, and is not a "human condition" concocted later by persons who are not sincere when they say that they accept papal privacy.
Yves Congar summed it up with admirable succinctness when he said of the ecclesiology common to a number of Gallican theologians, "One can, I believe, characterize it in the history of ecclesiological doctrines as the will not to let the pole Ecclesia be absorbed by the pole papacy."
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The Gallicans believed, he continued, that the divinely established authority of the Church is shared between the power of the episcopate and the power of the pope in such a way that "neither can be validly exercised without the other." 140 Both are essential and neither should be reduced to a merely nominal role. Tournély, a committed Gallican Catholic theologian, can be seen as "depreciating" the papacy only from a standpoint that believes with great intensity and total conviction that the only genuine "primacy" is one totally vested in one person and unlimited by any "human condition," that is, not shared with any other ministers of the Church, all of whom are simply subjects of the Roman pontiff.
